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Abstract Dementia is highly prevalent and incurable. The participation of
dementia patients in clinical research is indispensable if we want to find an effective
treatment for dementia. However, one of the primary challenges in dementia
research is the patients’ gradual loss of the capacity to consent. Patients with
dementia are characterized by the fact that, at an earlier stage of their life, they were
able to give their consent to participation in research. Therefore, the phase when
patients are still competent to decide offers a valuable opportunity to authorize
research, by using an advance research directive (ARD). Yet, the use of ARDs as an
authorization for research participation remains controversial. In this paper we
discuss the role of autonomous decision-making and the protection of incompetent
research subjects. We will show why ARDs are a morally defensible basis for the
inclusion of this population in biomedical research and that the use of ARDs is
compatible with the protection of incompetent research subjects.
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1 Introduction
Imagine this typical, and unfortunately prevalent, case: Mr. Jansen has been
suffering from dementia1 for the past 4 years. At the moment there is no cure for
dementia and he will lose more and more of his mental capacities. While previously
in his life he was able to make his own decisions, he is now at the point where he
has lost the capacities needed to competently make decisions. His wife will now
have to make decisions for him. One of the decisions she is facing is whether he will
participate in a research trial that aims to develop new treatments for the cognitive
decline due to dementia.
The participation in clinical research of dementia patients like Mr. Jansen is
essential for the development ofmore effective diagnostic instruments and therapeutic
interventions for this condition (Downs 1997; Warner and Nomani 2008; Selkoe
1992). Even though the inclusion of dementia patients in research is necessary, it is
also important that their participation is based on appropriate consent regimes. Patients
with dementia face an increased risk of becoming incompetent to provide informed
consent. Inmost countries, the legal possibilities for doing researchwith incapacitated
research subjects are limited2 and require the consent of a legal representative
(European Clinical Trials Directive 2001; Biomedicine Convention 1997). These
measures also have clear downsides: they restrict the possibilities of doing research
with dementia patients, are not based upon autonomous authorization of the research
participant and decisions made by legal representatives do not necessarily conform to
what the patients choosewhilst still competent (e.g. Stocking et al. 2006). Consent by a
legal representative has therefore been criticized for failing to represent the patient’s
wishes (Shalowitz et al. 2006). Given the often slowly progressive nature of dementia,
and the possibility of anticipating future incompetence, we suggest allowing dementia
patients to anticipate future research participation by signing an advance research
directive (ARD). In an ARD the dementia patient could describe his preferences
concerning future research participation.
ARDs are not yet commonly used in practice. In the United States, even though it
is not a legal standard, the NIH allows dementia patients to use ARDs, but these seem
to have a low rate of completion (Muthappan et al. 2005). In Europe, ARDs are not
yet used in the context of research,3 but for many health-care decisions, such as organ
1 We have not specified due to which disease Mr. Jansen is suffering from dementia, because we aim to
describe situations concerning cognitive decline, regardless of the underlying neurodegenerative disease.
Dementia is a collective term, but is not a disease itself. When we write a dementia patient, we mean a
person suffering from the symptoms of dementia due to an underlying illness, such as Alzheimer’s
disease.
2 In Europe, most guidelines and legislation set additional protective rules for the inclusion of
participants unable to consent, as consent of a legal representative is a necessary, but not sufficient
condition. Additional requirements include a direct benefit to the research subject, or if that is not likely
the study should not convey more than a minimal risk. These requirements are formulated to protect the
vulnerable research participant.
3 Switzerland is a noteworthy exception, with Art. 24, para. 1 of the domestic law stipulating that
‘‘[r]esearch projects involving persons unable to consent which offers prospects of direct benefit to
participants can be conducted if the following conditions are met: 1. the subjects have given their consent
when they were still competent and the consent is evidenced by a document;.’’ in the law.
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donation and end-of-life decisions, advance directives are accepted and widely used.
The use of advance directives in research remains, nevertheless, controversial, it is
argued for example that legal representatives should make decisions based on the
concept of ‘‘best-interest’’ and that an anticipated decision is neither free nor
informed (Dresser 2001, 2014; Fagerlin and Schneider 2004).
In this paper we address the following questions: (1) do ARDs provide a morally
defensible basis for including incapacitated dementia patients in research trials, (2)
are ARDs a better alternative to research authorization than consent by a legal
representative? and (3) what are the problems raised by the use of ARDs in
dementia research? We will argue that ARDs are a valuable authorization tool,
provide a morally defensible basis for the inclusion of dementia patients in research,
and are the better alternative to consent by a legal representative. Furthermore we
will show that the remaining issues all have to do with protection during the trial
and with withdrawal. Therefore we will start by discussing the moral aims of
informed consent as the gold standard for research authorization, and then we
explain the problems concerning the current practice of consent by a legal
representative and describe why ARDs are a reasonable option for research
authorization. Finally, we will discuss controversies for using ARDs, and
investigate possible solutions.
2 The moral aims of informed consent
The gold standard for acquiring a patient’s permission to be included in research is
‘‘informed consent’’. The informed-consent requirement gained prominence in
reaction to abuse of people in various experiments. The Nuremberg Code of
research ethics, an influential response to the cruelty of Nazi experiments,
stipulated: ‘‘the voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential’’ (The
Nuremberg Code 1949). The research participant must be adequately informed
about relevant facts of the research trial, and must provide free and informed
consent (The Nuremberg Code 1949; Beauchamp and Childress 2013). The moral
base of informed consent in research lies in the ethical obligation of respect for
persons. Respect for persons requires us to acknowledge the value of other persons
and to treat them as ends in themselves and not merely as means to ends (Belmont
Report 1979). Respect for persons has two moral dimensions: respect for autonomy
and protection of persons with diminished autonomy. Respect for autonomy derives
from the recognition that persons are rational and reflective beings who can choose
to live according to their values. Values are developed and learned over a time
period, adjusted, reflected upon and embodied. From these values, lasting
orientations with a rational component are derived, which shape the preferences
of the agent. This in contrast to wishes, which are merely an emotional desire at a
specific point in time and may change more rapidly. Wishes are not necessarily in
concordance with one’s values. When a wish and a preference are not concordant,
an autonomous agent can decide whether his preferences and values are primary, or
whether he follows a wish.
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Decisions of autonomous persons should be respected even when these do not
serve the well-being or the best interest of the person in an objective sense; it is his
life, it belongs to him and no one else (Feinberg 1989). Acts that could harm or
seem wrongful can be considered rightful as long as a person voluntarily consents to
bear these adverse consequences. As John Harris said: ‘‘consent is a dimension of
respect for persons in that it is through consenting to things that affect us that we
make those things consistent with our own values. When we consent to what others
propose we make their ends and objectives part of our own plans’’ (Harris 2003). As
biomedical research is not primarily aimed at the wellbeing of the participant—its
primary aim is to collect data and gain knowledge—autonomous authorization is
absolutely necessary. This authorization is generally understood as a continuous
process; throughout the research trial the patient should be willing to continue
participation, and is free to withdraw at any time for any reason.
The informed-consent approach respects the autonomy of participants competent
to make decisions, but is problematic when subjects lack decision-making capacity.
Dementia patients progressively lose higher cognitive functions such as memory,
reasoning, comprehension and judgment and understanding in the more advanced
stages (Bielby 2008; Logsdon et al. 2002; McKhann et al. 2011). Therefore, they
face an increased risk of becoming incompetent.4 When a person becomes
incompetent and is not (fully) capable of providing free, voluntary and informed
consent, the second meaning of respect for persons acquires prominence protection.
The extent of the required protection varies for the capacities that are lost, depends
on the specific situation and should depend on the risk of harm and the likelihood of
benefit (Belmont Report 1979). The protection of incompetent research subjects is
not absolute; it does not result in the exclusion of incompetent persons from
research altogether, but additional requirements regarding the risk and burden of
research apply in most jurisdictions and the consent of a legal representative is
required. The protection of incompetent research subjects should, however, not
imply the complete exclusion of the incompetent person from the authorization
process, especially not when this person anticipated his future incompetence.
3 The problems of consent by a legal representative
In the light of the moral aims of the informed consent requirement it becomes
apparent that the current legal standard of substituted authorization by a legal
representative (proxy consent) is problematic in several ways. In this section we will
argue that (1) proxy consent does not do justice to the voice of the research
participant, (2) making decisions as a legal representative is no easy task and (3)
research possibilities are limited when autonomous authorization by the research
subject is not possible.
4 Autonomy and competence differ in meaning, autonomy implies self-governance and competence
implies the ability to perform a task, but the criteria for the competent person and for the autonomous
person are remarkably similar (Beauchamp and Childress 2013).
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Firstly, the authority of proxy consent comes from the assumption that legal
representatives know the incapacitated person well and can give voice to what the
research participants would have decided. This is also reflected in the fact that some
legal guidelines for proxy consent require the legal representative to act on the basis
of the persons’ presumed will (e.g. WMO Dutch National Law, European Clinical
Trials Directive 2001). However, even with good intentions and with knowing each
other well, epistemic problems persist due to the lack of transparency we have to
each other, especially in unusual situations (Holm 2001). The underlying
assumption that legal representatives know what the incapacitated person would
have decided is thus questionable, and the proxies’ judgements about their loved
ones’ preferences are often discordant (Kim et al. 2013). Empirical studies in which
legal representatives and patients with mild dementia were interviewed separately
about the willingness to participate in clinical research trials show that legal
representatives are either too reluctant to authorize enrolment in clinical trials, or
consent to studies that do not really correspond to the preferences and values of the
persons they represent (e.g. Stocking et al. 2006; Shalowitz et al. 2006). Decisions
made by legal representatives do not respect the autonomy of research participants,
because they do little justice to the preferences of incapacitated subjects. Therefore
they are a poor means to extend the incompetent participant’s voice in the decision-
making process. Interestingly, a majority of dementia patients would leave their
legal representative (some) leeway to make decisions for them in the future that
differ from their own preferences, if the legal representative would get access to
better or more information (Kim et al. 2013). However, a minority would not be
comfortable with legal representatives making decisions against their own
preferences (Kim et al. 2013; Stocking et al. 2006), these persons would want
their legal representatives to give voice to their own preferences and wishes.
Secondly, legal representatives experience their task to make decisions for their
incompetent loved ones’ as difficult, and have problems in bearing the burden and
responsibility of making decisions for a dementia patient (Livingston 2010;
Sugarman et al. 2001). They experience guilt and stress and have problems with
processing the provided information (Wendler and Rid 2011). To make decisions as
a legal representative is especially hard in circumstances in which long time roles
and patterns of authority are reversed and confidences are sometimes breached
(Livingston et al. 2010). For example, it is conceivable that a child who has always
been obedient to his parents, will have difficulties in taking the lead when his
authoritarian parent becomes incompetent to make his own decisions.
Thirdly, the possibilities of doing research without the consent of the research
participant are rather limited. Proxy consent is a less robust authorization than
authorization by the research subject himself, and consent by a legal representative
has only little moral authority compared to autonomous authorization by the
research subject. Therefore, the measure and extent to which a third party may
expose the incompetent research subject to risk or harm is limited to either
therapeutic research, or non-therapeutic research with minimal risk and minimal
burden (e.g. Biomedicine Convention 1997; European Clinical Trials Directive
2001). The possibilities of doing research with dementia patients, based on proxy
consent, are therefore limited.
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4 Advance research directives as a reasonable option
Given the often slowly progressive nature of dementia, and therefore the possibility
of anticipating future incompetence, dementia patients could anticipate future
research participation by signing an ARD. Dementia patients have ‘‘a history of
autonomy’’ and have lived a life in which they have expressed their ideals and
preferences. Now they have lost the capacities to make their own decisions, their
own voice should still matter in the authorization process. Advance directives make
this possible to some extent. We will argue that (1) autonomous decisions may be
directed at the future (2) that respecting autonomy goes beyond respecting the
wishes of competent persons, (3) that ARDs capture autonomous wishes and (4)
legal representatives may benefit from ARDs.
Firstly, if the principle of respect for autonomy requires us to respect a competent
patient’s decisions, then it also requires us to respect such decisions made in
advance. A person can exercise autonomy not only by making decisions in the
present, but also by making decisions that will influence what is to happen in the
future (Davis 2007). The difference between autonomy and anticipated or so called
precedent autonomy is that precedent autonomy involves a longer passage of time,
and the mere passage of time makes no difference to the moral authority of an
agent’s autonomous act (Rhoden 1990). For many other decisions we reason
according to this principle as well; the marriage, living will, advance care directive
and the mortgage of the dementia patient remain lawful, even though there has been
a passing of time. We have no reason to presume that an autonomous decision
concerning research participation should be treated differently.
Secondly, respecting autonomy also implies respecting former decisions that
shaped and gave meaning to the life of the now incompetent person (Buchanan and
Brock 1990), as long as the decision is not changed or renounced in the meantime.
Dementia robs patients of the capacities to understand or reaffirm the prior
expressed wishes. Having lost the capacities to reaffirm prior preferences is,
however, not the same as having changed or renounced their prior preference. In
order to find out whether the prior set preferences are still applicable, we should try
to imagine what the dementia patient would prefer in the current situation, if he
were competent to decide5 (Davis 2002). Think for example about a Jehovah’s
witness who has explicitly stated that he does not want to receive a blood donation if
he would need it during surgery, this request remains to be an autonomous wish, and
remains authoritative and leading, even if the Jehovah’s witness is unconscious and
would, from a medical perspective, need a blood transfusion in order to survive. If
there are no strong reasons to assume otherwise, the prior stated preferences
continue to carry significance and should be the default for decision-making.
Thirdly, an ARD captures the preferences of an autonomous person directed at
the future and functions as a means to exercise one’s right to choose a future beyond
one’s decision-making capacity (Beauchamp and Childress 2013; Davis 2007;
5 Davis (2002) notes that it is impossible to be demented and have full mental capacity at the same time,
therefore rather than imagining the patient in her actual circumstances with full mental capacity, we
should imagine the patient in circumstances as similar as possible to her actual circumstances, but in such
a manner that, unlike her actual condition, she has full mental capacity.
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Vollmann 2001; Dworkin 1986; Alzheimer Europe 2006). In an ARD the dementia
patient can, at the time that he is still competent, describe his preferences
concerning research participation and describe which risks and burden he is willing
to bear. Thereby consent with an ARD does justice to the moral aim of autonomous
authorization of informed consent, because it is an authorization given by the
autonomous research subject. If we consider the authorization given in an ARD
similar to authorization of informed consent, a research subject should also be
allowed to authorize his participation in research trials containing more than
minimal risk and burden (Pierce 2010; Buller 2014), as long as the patient was also
informed and free to decide at the moment the ARD was written. An ARD would
thus allow for a broader range of research trials than the current legal standard, and
could enable valuable research in the search of a treatment for dementia. Besides,
making an advance directive is itself an exercise of autonomy. The person may
benefit from knowing that he has done everything he could to be treated in the way
he wants to at times of incompetence (Singer et al. 1992).
On a more practical level, we recognise that dementia patients are very
dependent on their legal representatives, even if only for logistical and practical
support. Legal representatives will regardless of the existence of an ARD, remain to
play a role when the dementia patient becomes incompetent. ARDs can also help the
legal representative in supporting research decisions according to the research
participant’s prior preferences.
5 Controversies of ARDs
We have argued that there are strong reasons why ARDs provide an ethically
permissible base for research authorization; there are also some difficulties that
should be considered carefully. In this section we will discuss some concerns and
controversies to the use of ARDs for dementia patients.
5.1 The moral authority of the ARD
A general claim against the use of advance directives, is that respect for autonomy
should not be primary in decision making for dementia patients, and that the ‘‘best-
interest’’ principle should be primary (Dresser 1992; Robertson 1991). This
objection to autonomy trumping other values, entails that decisions should be based
on choices that are beneficial to the dementia patient according to the assessment of
others and it is assumed that (1) preferences do not survive the loss of mental
incapacity, or (2) the person is incompetent to decide about future questions,
therefore autonomy should not be primary.
The first assumption implies that preferences formulated while competent no
longer have meaning once the person is incompetent. An advance directive that
captures prior preferences should therefore not be followed. Instead, it is argued, the
patient’s current wishes should be primary in decision-making. It is a questionable
assumption to state that the dementia patient’s preferences and values do not survive
the cognitive decline, because the cognitive decline implies a loss of functions, not
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necessarily of values. The difficulty in the case of dementia patients is of course that
they may not express the prior expressed preference anymore, but that is not the
same as having changed or renounced prior preferences. When cognitive capacities
decline, and reflection upon their preferences and values is not possible anymore,
we cannot simply argue that this person has developed a new preference or has
changed his earlier values. Due to dementia, capacities to remember and live
according to prior preferences are forgotten, rather than changed consciously.
Furthermore, which values and preferences remain is not the result of a reflective
process; therefore we cannot assume that the current unreflected wishes of the
incompetent dementia patients should be primary. Dementia patients lose the
capacities to make their own decisions, but it is unwarranted to conclude that their
life is not their own anymore, and that their own earlier preferences no longer
matter.
The second assumption regards the incompetence to decide about future
decisions. In general we agree to respect decisions of competent persons in the
research context, when they are free from coercion and based on sufficient
information, even if these decisions might harm the person in question. The
sufficiency of information can be questioned when during the time gap between
signing and the use of the ARD, new information about the research trial or about
specific procedures emerges. Authorization of research participation should ideally
be based on the most up-to-date information in order to inform the research
participant adequately. The moral authority of an ARD based on insufficient or false
information is weakened (Buchanan and Brock 1990; Davis 2007). However, this
does not mean that an ARD will never be based on sufficient information. As we
have argued before, a research participant needs to be informed adequately, which
does not imply fully informed. Therefore, as long as the anticipated authorization is
based on sufficient and up-to-date information, the authorization given with an ARD
should be considered a competent and valid decision.
Dresser (1999) states that an anticipated decision cannot be a truly informed
decision, because the competent person needs to anticipate a situation he has never
experienced; namely being incapacitated. It may be difficult for a healthy person to
anticipate one’s own wishes when ill. The future-oriented preference is based on
assumptions, that may either overestimate the suffering or underestimate the burden
the illness or medical interventions will impose (Dresser 1986). It may be even more
difficult to anticipate the ill and cognitively impaired persons’ experience of
research participation (Dresser 2001, 2014). It is questioned whether any competent
person is ever fully able to anticipate the point of view of his incapacitated future
version (Dresser 1999; Fagerlin and Schneider 2004). It remains however unclear
why from the anticipatory character of the decision, it should follow that prior
preferences are to be ignored altogether. To illustrate that we generally accept
anticipatory decisions from competent persons, independent of whether they are
foreseen accurately or inaccurately, consider the following example. A person might
want to have a tattoo, but has no clue whether he will be a person who likes tattoos
when he is 65, but he also has no clue whether he will regret it when he has not
taken a tattoo in fear of his future judgement. Whether he gets a tattoo or not, as
long as he is competent, is a valid and autonomous decision, regardless of whether
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he agrees with it later or not. The possibility of being mistaken in hindsight, with a
former anticipatory decision, is no reason to disregard the moral authority of this
decision. It is, however, a good reason to allow dementia patients a way out, when
they indeed appear to have foreseen the decision wrongly.
In more general terms, the best-interest account is disanalogous in the research
context because research is never primarily in the participants best-interest. It could
be argued that therapeutic effects from a research trial are ‘‘a reasonable person’s’’
best interest, but therapeutic effects alone are never a sufficient reason to include
anybody in any research study.
Furthermore, the best-interest account overlooks the point that the dementia
patient has not always been incompetent to decide. It remains unclear, why any
proxy would be in the best position to decide about research participation and how
this proxy can decide about the willingness to participate. Even if the legal
representative would succeed in giving voice to the preferences of the research
subject, it remains doubtful that a proxy would be better at estimating what is in the
person’s interest than the research participant himself. Furthermore, legal
representatives may decide for the now incompetent person, because the represen-
tative is competent. Deciding for an incompetent person would, according to
Dresser (1999) and Fagerlin and Schneider (2004) argument, involve the
anticipation to a state of incompetence, which is arguably an even more difficult
task for a legal representative, since he would not only have to anticipate to this
state of incompetence but also to the point of view of the person they represent. It is
therefore a questionable assumption that it is a better option to let the legal
representative decide for incompetent research subjects. An ARD provides a more
solid moral foundation for decision-making than the best interest account and the
current standard of consent by a legal representative.
6 Protection during the trial: risk, burden and withdrawal
Regardless of how the consent is given, by a research participant himself or by
consent of a proxy, moral and practical questions emerge when the research
participant does not want to (continue to) participate when the research takes place.
This problem is thus not specific for the use of ARDs, and appears after initial
authorization is given. This problem is related to the idea that informed consent
should be a continuous process, rather than a momentary authorization, and the
willingness to participate should persist during the trial.
At this point, we should make an important and necessary distinction between the
anticipation of future risks and the anticipation of future burden. Arguably, the
anticipation of risks is more stable than the anticipation of burden due to the nature
of these concepts. The assessment whether a risk is acceptable is based on abstract
information and depends on characteristics of a procedure. In order to assess
whether a person is willing to take a risk, it is necessary to be competent, because
information forms the base for risk-assessment. The willingness to take a certain
risk does not change over the course of a trial, as long as the provided information
has been accurate. By contrast, the assessment of burden has an experiential
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element, and as dementia patients remain able to have subjective experiences, they
are still able to experience the burden (Berghmans 2000). Therefore, even though
the burden seemed acceptable when the ARD was signed, the burden might be
experienced differently. This warrants for extra precautions during the trial. The
research participant deserves to be protected against undue burden, especially when
he is incapacitated. This objection does not question the initial authorization given
by an ARD, but shows that withdrawal can be problematic for this population.
Moreover it is important to mention that withdrawal from research, in contrast to
consent, does not need to be an autonomous decision, and may be done for any
reason at any time. However, in order to be able to withdraw from a trial, it is at
least necessary to know or remember that you are taking part in a research trial.
Research participants suffering from dementia may have forgotten this.
As dementia patients are limited in their abilities to express reasons for
withdrawal; they largely depend on others for protecting their well-being during the
trial. The level of burden should be monitored continuously and when the
participant objects more than anticipated to a research procedure, we have reasons
to withdraw him from the procedure, because we cannot be sure the participant is
willing to continue participation. Here also lies a role for legal representatives, to act
as a safeguard against exploitation and to provide protection.
7 What this all implies for Mr. Jansen
Autonomous decision-making is an important corner stone for research participation
and, from a moral point of view; we argue that respect for autonomy cannot be
disregarded for demented research participants. It is clearly desirable for persons to
be able to have some say about their future and extend the influence of their
autonomously formed preferences. It is precisely in anticipating circumstances in
which one does not have the capacities to make decisions anymore, that dementia
patients may want their preferences to be followed, in order to give direction to their
own lives. Even though dementia patients might want to be careful with their future
selves, that will be more vulnerable and less able to carry burden, the decision of
how much burden they are willing to bear and to what extent the current person’s
interests may be compromised should remain up to them. Therefore, his precedent
autonomy should remain primary, as long as there are no strong reasons to assume
otherwise. The ARD is in such cases valid as an initial authorization and is given by
an autonomous agent, and would thus allow for the same range of risk and burden in
research trials as would informed consent. Thereby ARDs would enable valuable
research in the search of a treatment for dementia.
The objections against the use of ARDs (Fagerlin and Schneider 2004; Dresser
1992, 1999, 2014; Robertson 1991) are objections against advance directives in
general. ARDs are a special type of advance directive, because they authorize
research participation. While for treatment in some cases the will of the patient may
be overruled, it is never acceptable to include a research participant in a trial without
his consent. Possible therapeutic effects alone are not enough reason to justify
research participation. Authorization is necessary, even if it is likely that a trial will
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benefit the participant; this underlines the difference between research and treatment
(Jongsma and van de Vathorst 2014). Furthermore the opponents of advance
directives do not convince in disregarding the anticipated preferences of the
dementia patients nor do they succeed in disproving the moral authority of ARDs.
They merely show that autonomous authorization is necessary, but not sufficient,
and we should allow dementia patients a way out, when they are burdened more
than anticipated.
Respect for persons implies that we should not only respect prior autonomy, but
also protect the no longer autonomous patients during the trial. We therefore need to
find an adequate balance between respecting the prior autonomy of dementia
patients and protecting the incompetent research participant during the trial.
Dementia patients remain conscious and present during the trial, as opposed to
many other situations advance directives are used for; i.e. post mortem directives.
We should therefore remain cautious and look for signs of resistance or objection to
undue burden during the research procedures. Any indication that the incapacitated
person is suffering more than anticipated should be taken seriously and is a good
reason to stop the research procedure, but does not imply the overall exclusion of
this person from research altogether. The wish to stop may not based on the person’s
values, because it is unreflected and temporary, and should not be understood as an
act against the moral authority of the ARD. The temporary resistance against the
research procedure should result in stopping the research procedure, but continu-
ation in the research trial at a later period of time, based on the anticipated
preference, would be tenable.
Coming back to the case described in the introduction, we would like to argue
that it is a lost opportunity that Mr. Jansen has little to say in his current research
decisions. Autonomous authorization is required for doing research with human
participants. The exclusion of dementia patients from the authorization process
altogether is not self-evidently justifiable. From a moral point of view, we argue that
there should be more attention to the prior autonomy of demented research
participants, particularly as research does not primarily aim to benefit the research
participants. An ARD offers Mr. Jansen the opportunity to give direction to his life
beyond his own competence. As autonomous persons are considered to be in the
best position to give direction to their lives, anticipated autonomous decisions
should be respected as well. As long as Mr. Jansen is competent to give informed
consent he can, at least in Europe, participate in research trials containing more than
minimal risks, also when these trials do not directly benefit him. We have argued
that as long as an anticipated authorization is based on sufficient and up-to-date
information, it should be allowed to cover the same range of research trials as
informed consent of a competent person.
8 Conclusion
Consent to participation in research is ideally based on informed, free and
competent authorization, by an agent who has ‘‘here and now’’ autonomy. This ideal
is out of reach for incapacitated dementia patients, as they are no longer competent.
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The current legal standard for including incompetent research subjects in research
trials requires the consent of the legal representative, but fails to do justice to the
moral aim of respect for autonomy. It is remarkable that there is currently only
limited attention to the moral aim of autonomous authorization of dementia patients.
ARDs offer dementia patients a way to control their life beyond their own
competence.
ARDs can help in authorising research participation, but we should provide
protection to research subjects once they become incompetent. This protection is
necessary during the trial, by remaining cautious of burdening incompetent research
participants more than they anticipated. The remaining issues of using advance
directives for research subjects with dementia do not question the ARD as an
authorization tool, but all have to do with withdrawal and resistance.
We conclude that both aims of respect for persons, authorization and protection,
are served when ARDs are used to authorize for research participation. ARDs allow
patients to keep control beyond their own incompetence and are a morally
defensible basis for authorizing research participation, but ARDs cannot solve all
problems of doing research with incapacitated participants, therefore extra
precautions remain necessary.
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